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reviewing a guard of honour in Berlin and one 
of an unidentified British Liberal candidate 
campaigning, both taken in 1935, allow Bernard 
to contrast opposing political ideologies (pages 
342-43); images of the first UFO sighting and 
the explosion of the first hydrogen bomb, both 
made in 1952, touch upon deeply felt anxieties 
over the fragility of human existence during 
the cold war period (pages 532-33) while, in a 
pair of images that are deliberately polemical, 
Don McCullin's image of a starving Biafran girl 
and Irving Penn's "Nubile Young Beauty of 
Diamoré, Cameroon," both taken in 1969, 
Bernard under l ines the pers is tence of 
contradictory Western attitudes towards the 
post-colonial world (pages 738-39). Such 
provocative juxtapositions invest historical 
events and societal values with an inherent 
richness and complexity. 
Century squats massively on one's desk, a 
dark, obdurate presence. In the sheer number 
of images, it is staggering and overwhelming; in 
the accumulated record of violence and sorrow 
and the seemingly unresolvable conflicts, it is 
tireless and without remorse. As a commentary 
on the legacy of the twentieth century, this 
book stands as a painful yet fascinating 
memorial and ironic monument, and reads as 
a Pandora's box of misery and anguish. 
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In The End of the World as We Know It, Daniel 
Wojcik explores one very "timely" aspect of 
American popular religion: apocalyptic 
traditions as they are interpreted at the turn of 
the second millennium. Most (but not all) of 
these predict global catastrophe in the 
immediate future. This "apocalypse" is to be 
followed in most (but not all) cases by some 
form of redemption or renewal (at least for 
initiates). Although some scenarios involve 
natural catastrophes, such as comets or meteors, 
the ones of most interest to readers of this 
journal involve technological catastrophes such 
as ecological degradation and nuclear war. 
Wojcik shows how myths of technology have 
become deeply embedded in both traditional 
religion (new versions not only of Protestant 
millenarianism but also of Catholic pietism) 
and "secular religion" (new communities based 
on myths about either benevolent or malevolent 
use of technology by extraterrestrial beings). 
The book consists of eight chapters. The first 
two, "Approaching Doomsday" and "The 
American Apocalyptic Legacy," discuss the 
relation between traditional and modern forms 
of speculation about the "endtimes." Traditional 
speculation has usually focussed attention on 
an era of rampant evil, a cataclysm of cosmic 
proportions, Christ's return (or Rapture), and the 
ultimate salvation or damnation of human 
beings. Contemporary speculation often adds 
additional features. A common one is the 
conspiracy of international bankers, multi-
national corporations, prototypes of world 
government, united churches, and so on; this 
is said to have been made possible by those who 
control the Internet and other advanced forms 
of communication. . 
In the third and fourth chapters, Wojcik 
discusses two cases studies drawn from 
traditional religion. The first is an offshoot of 
Protestant fundamentalism. In "The American 
Apocalyptic Legacy," Wojcik discusses Hal 
Lindsey, author of The Late Great Planet Earth. 
His prediction of approaching doom for all but 
the chosen few, an event completely beyond 
human control or even influence, features 
technological disasters such as Chernobyl and 
the continuing likelihood of nuclear war. The 
book has been attacked repeatedly by liberal 
Christians, among others, for fostering passivity 
in the face of major environmental and other 
problems. Nevertheless, he and his followers 
have never been stronger. One reason for that 
is their ability to interpret news events, 
especially those involving the Middle East and 
Russia, in the light of ancient prophecy. The 
second case study is an offshoot of Catholic 
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pietism. Our Lady of the Roses, Mary Help of 
Mothers, is a community that originated in 
apparitions of the Virgin Mary to a Brooklyn 
housewife named Veronica Lueken. Through 
Lueken, the Virgin sent messages about the 
coming end of the world and what followers 
could do to save themselves. An interesting 
feature of this community is its central act of 
worship. Initiates gather to take photographs of 
the sky and its cloud formations, which are 
then interpreted communally in the light of 
traditional prophecy or iconography. These 
movements, ironically, rely heavily on modern 
technology. Both movements have used it to 
spread the word. Leuken's, moreover, has used 
it to mediate the word in a more direct sense. 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters discuss 
various aspects of the apocalyptic mentality, 
notably fatalism and, as a result in some cases, 
reliance on otherworldly beings or forces for 
salvation. In "Secular Apocalyptic Themes in the 
Nuclear Era," Wojcik shows how the Bomb has 
had à decisive influence on the way people think 
about their world and its future—one that 
continues even after the Cold War. (He says hardly 
anything about that other technological wonder 
known in its representative form as Auschwitz. 
For some reason, that form of mass death—far 
more sinister in purely moral terms—is not 
considered dramatic enough to qualify as an 
apocalypse or even as the sign of the coming one.) 
In Chapter 8, "Emergent Apocalyptic Beliefs 
about UFOs and Extraterrestrial Beings," Wojcik 
notes that the earliest myths focussed on benign 
aliens who come to help humanity move 
another rung up the ladder of evolution (by 
mating with humans , say, or providing 
advanced technologies) and, therefore, to save 
them from some approaching doom (whether 
due to human technology or interstellar forces). 
Later, these myths took on much darker 
overtones; the aliens were evil beings whose 
intention was to repopulate our world with 
their own kind. Even worse, according to some 
myths , these a l iens re l ied on human 
collaborators in high places. At the moment, 
says Wojcik, some myths have once again 
become hopeful. But the general mood of those 
involved in these movements remains very 
fatalistic. Even those who take steps to find 
salvation, for instance, sometimes do so by 
means of collective suicide. 
This book, though somewhat repetitive, is 
very well written. Moreover, it is well illustrated 
with black-and-white illustrations from 
newspapers, comic books, paintings, pamphlets, 
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advertisements, and so on. I can think of no 
major flaw in the author's thesis; even though 
his field is literature and folklore rather than 
religious studies, he clearly understands the 
basic currents of American religion—including 
popular religion, which is often ignored by 
scholars in the field. And, perhaps surprisingly, 
he is not unsympathetic to the people he is 
studying, a hallmark of good phenomenology. 
Whatever Wojcik thinks of the solutions offered 
by apocalyptic communities, he makes it clear 
that they are faced with real problems—the 
kind of problems, in fact, that are faced by 
all people in our t ime: the apparen t 
meaninglessness of a society based on 
hedonism, lack of control over technological 
developments, despair over the cynicism of 
public life, and so forth. 
To all of this, I would add only two things. 
Both place the current wave of apocalyptic 
speculation in its larger historical and cultural 
contexts. First, the preoccupation with collec-
tive doom was probably far more pervasive in 
the 1990s than it was in the 990s. A thousand 
years ago, most people were not even aware of 
the date, let alone of what theological 
significance it might have had. In our time, 
due to much higher rates of literacy and 
technologica l ly advanced forms of 
communication, almost everyone is aware of 
these things. And the Internet has made it 
possible for people to exchange ideas about the 
" e n d t i m e s " and bui ld real or v i r tual 
communities based on apocalyptic notions. On 
the other hand, the same kind of preoccupation 
was probably even more pervasive in Europe as 
a response to the Black Death. This was most 
severe during the fourteenth century but was 
revived during the seventeenth, partly because 
of Christian speculation on the Kabbalah. And 
Christians were not the only ones involved. 
Due to their own speculations, and due to 
widespread misery and persecution, Jews 
produced the most successful messianic 
movement since biblical times. Millions of 
European Jews believed Shabbetai Tsvi, the 
messianic claimant, who predicted a speedy 
end to the world of suffering (until he tried to 
repeat his success in the Turkish Empire but 
ended up converting to Islam). 
Speculation about the end is by no means 
confined, moreover, to the West. The world 
comes to an end according to Hinduism, too, for 
example. And not once but many times. 
The fact is that all or most cultures see the 
world of everyday life in finite terms. The 
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notion of sacred time, properly called eternity, 
could well be universal in one form or another. 
It is based precisely on the notion that profane 
time, properly called history, has at least one 
beginning and end. And the end, like the 
beginning in many cases, is a cataclysmic event. 
The Hindu cycles are extremely long by Jewish 
and Christian standards (though not by 
scientific ones). But those of some other cultures 
are (or once were) extremely short, beginning 
annually on New Year's Day. 
Second, readers might get the mistaken 
impression that technology has become 
problematic only in the past few decades. But 
that phenomenon is hardly new. It was not new 
in 1945, when the first atomic bombs were 
dropped (and Auschwitz was. liberated). Or in 
1914, when people got their first glimpse of 
mechanized and industrialized warfare. Or in 
1912, when the technologically advanced Titanic 
foundered on its maiden voyage. Or even in the 
early nineteenth century, when philosophers 
despaired over the "satanic mills" and Luddites 
smashed the machinery inside. The truth is 
technological change has always presented 
problems, always made people uneasy, and 
often provoked significant religious responses. 
That is because technological change involves 
both advantages and disadvantages. At the very 
least, it has always involved abandoning the 
old ways and adapting to the new. Sometimes, 
it involves much more than that. 
Consider the technological revolution that 
began with hor t i cu l tu re . After many 
generations, the wooden hoe was replaced by 
the wooden plough and then the iron plough. 
Agriculture provided a more reliable source of 
food than hunt ing and gathering, and, 
eventually, the population grew. But agriculture 
meant being tied to the land, having to defend 
it against invaders, and being ready to invade 
other communities for more and better land. 
(And remember that when ancient societies 
were conquered , it often meant total 
destruction—the functional equivalent, for those 
threatened, of the Bomb.) Agriculture itself 
required a high level of organization (designing 
and building irrigation projects, storage 
facilities, distribution networks, roads, and so 
on). So did warfare (the production of maps and 
weapons, strategic planning, espionage, 
diplomacy) and the administration of early 
states (written records, delegation of authority). 
The result was a need for specialized classes. 
And that, in turn, meant the institutionalization 
of hierarchies and some degree of tyranny. All 
of these developments were accompanied by 
the rise of complex new religions. Apart from 
anyth ing else, these p rov ided ethical 
frameworks for the use of power and symbolic 
valorization of new technologies, usually in 
the form of deities associated with agriculture. 
The process of adaptation took centuries, not 
decades. But the ancients were probably just as 
frightened of new technologies as their modern 
counterparts are. In fact, their hostility is 
recorded in the Old Testament as the protracted 
struggle between nomadic life as pastoralists in 
the wilderness (associated by the prophets with 
purity, holiness, and virtue) and settled life in 
agrarian Canaan (associated with impurity, 
pollution, and vice). 
In view of all this, it is worth noting at least 
two well-known movies from the period before 
Hiroshima. Technology is associated with 
doom, in both cases, or at least the chaos of 
revolution or war. One is the silent classic from 
Germany, Metropolis (Fritz Lang, 1926). It 
speculates on the profound social divisions 
that are likely to be generated by modern 
technology. Members of a technocratic caste 
live in idle splendor above ground. Meanwhile, 
members of a slave cast, those whose physical 
labour keeps the machines working, live in 
Dickensian squalor below ground. Until they are 
inspired to rebel by a beautiful but satanic robot 
named Maria! The other movie, from Britain, is 
Things to Come (William Cameron Menzies, 
1936). Based on a novel by H. G. Wells and 
made on the eve of the Second World War, it 
speculates on the physical and cultural 
destruction likely to be brought about by an 
apocalyptic world war. Both movies end with 
a new beginning. 
But Wojcik's aim is to tell the specific story 
of American millennial speculation since 
1945. And he does so extremely well. This 
book is highly recommended for students of 
technology, religion, popular culture, and 
American culture. 
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